The West’s new Bandung-moment should spur the EU into action
In April 1955, the heads of government of 29 African and Asian countries gathered in the Javanese city of Bandung. With an expanding Cold War dividing the world into two blocs, the assembled countries collectively signed instead for neutrality and peace, laying the foundation for what would become the Non-Aligned Movement: countries seeking a position of autonomy and flexibility on the world stage. Their neutrality was both a silent revenge on the former European colonizers and the exploitation of the Cold War for national gain.
Seventy years later, a new cold war is in the making, with Ukraine as the hot front line in Europe. A new conference, on neutral ground in Switzerland, was held a week ago to unite countries for a lasting peace that recognizes the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This was predictably done without the aggressor Russia and its de facto ally China. But what is surprising is the list of countries present that have chosen to remain neutral and have avoided signing the final declaration. Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates: many of the former Bandung countries are rediscovering and reconfirming geopolitical neutrality in a new century.
We in Europe should pause and take notice. Most of Asia, Africa, South and Central America are not on the European side for a peace that starts with rejecting territorial conquest by Russia. This is the West’s new Bandung moment. For reasons that echo that precedent from the previous century – a mix of anti-Western resentment and geopolitical opportunism – what is now called the Global South is rejecting our moral compass for world order and is declaring itself an open hunting ground for the competing forces of the new cold war.
For the countries that do share the European vision of peace – the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – Ukraine is a secondary front in the global contest between America and China. We know that the US has also become less reliable politically. We know that territorial integrity in Europe is a pipe dream without a large-scale and long-term capacity for common defence and security, which we do not (yet) have. If we believe in our own principles, if we want to restore our moral authority in the world, we will have to prepare ourselves for a long period of military, technological and geopolitical struggle.
If we still want to shape the course of history positively, Europe will have to do in the 21st century what the US did in the 20th century: to unite military, economic and technological power. To use this combined power strategically and geopolitically, with the carrot and the stick, with moral alliances where possible, with realpolitik where necessary. The good news is that we already realize this. The competitiveness of the European economy, European autonomy in critical technology and value chains, European industrial policy, European geopolitics in energy, trade and with the lubricant of European foreign direct investments, a more common European defence: it is all on the drawing board of the European Union. These are the right and necessary priorities.
The bad news is that drawing and executing are two different things. The European Union lacks the centralized political power and financial resources to compete at scale with China or the US. European countries often remain divided in their geopolitical outlook beyond the immediate urgency of the war in Ukraine. European defence, strategic industry and technology remain primarily a race of national champions and domestic subsidies. Overall, the European Union often acts too little too late, while its member states are too small or too weak to make a difference themselves. This is neither desirable nor sustainable.
To achieve more impact at speed, the European Union needs to overcome its political and budgetary constraints. Institutional reforms in EU-governance and EU-funding would be welcome, particularly in light of future enlargement. But this process would draw precious political energy, create further delays, and spark the flames of political dissent among and within member states. We will have to be more creative to face the emergency in the short run. Instead of seeking EU-wide action, the EU can support and enable coalitions of the willing among its member states. Indeed, this is already happening in common defence and security. Clusters of countries can move forward in other areas, generating leverage for European industrial strategy, technological autonomy, critical infrastructure, and the like.
The key is funding. The EU has learned two things. Its post-pandemic recovery fund has shown the limits of what can be achieved by scattering European funds across all member states and across hundreds of domestic projects. The relaxation of state aid rules has shown the risks of subsidy races among member states, and the limits of isolated national action in the face of Chinese and US competition. We must find ways to focus resources on projects instead of on member states, and to pool resources at EU-level without more formal EU-funding.
Coalitions of the willing among states can also be funding coalitions: member states pooling national resources for shared projects, particularly in shared infrastructure or industrial joint ventures. The existing EU-framework for transnational projects of common European interest could be used as the sole remaining route to allow and channel direct national state aid for business in key areas. Developing the EU capital market further could facilitate new investment instruments for strategic EU-priorities, including technology and defence. A new common debt vehicle could be focused on similar shared pan-European projects.
Call it the Airbus-model. The EU in the past has shown it can find a way to combine national interests with economic meritocracy for a shared industrial and technological priority. Multiply and diversify this approach to speed up the geopolitical missions of the new European Union. The clock is ticking.
